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I. Introduction
Since its inception, rock and roll music has been the voice
of non-conformity, individual expression and youthful
rebellion. The counter-cultural message of rock music
in its various incarnations, including hip-hop, heavy
metal and industrial among countless others, permeates
our global culture. Ironically, as radical strains of rock
music have been disseminated throughout the world, the
industry that produces and distributes this very brand of
music has grown increasingly concentrated. As com-
panies within the music industry have grown, they have
needed to increase uniformity and standardization in order
to achieve economies of scale and maximize their profits.
The growth and current structure of the music indus-
try not only belie the message of individuality and non-
conformity espoused by the music it produces, but makes
it susceptible to the scrutiny of the government and
regulators. In May of 2000, as the Recording Industry
Association of America ("RIAA") rallied against file-
sharing technologies such as Napster, arguing that
digital downloading constituted "stealing," the five
largest record companies quietly settled charges
of antitrust violations by the Federal Trade Com-
mission ("FTC"). 2 The FTC alleged that the coop-
erative advertising programs they established with
downstream retailers unfairly restricted competition,
costing consumers in excess of $480 million. 3
This Note argues that the recording industry's coop-
erative advertising programs do not run afoul of federal
antitrust laws and, in fact, promote interbrand competi-
tion. It examines the implications of the cooperative
advertising programs adopted by record companies in
light of current federal antitrust law. Contrary to claims
made by the FTC, the recording industry's actions can
withstand antitrust scrutiny because Minimum Adver-
tised Pricing ("MAP") policies serve pro-competitive
business purposes.4 As will be discussed in further
detail below, the recording industry has a legitimate
interest in pursuing policies that help traditional
music retailers stay in business in the face of
crippling competition by large discount retailers.
Part II of this Note presents a brief overview of
the structure of the pre-recorded music industry and
discusses the threat that traditional music retailers faced
when large nationwide discount chains entered the retail
compact disc ("CD") market. The arrival of "loss-
leaders," firms who sell compact discs below the equi-
librium price as a means to gain market share, prompted
the industry's recourse to stricter MAP policies.
Part III of this Note provides a summary of the rel-
evant federal antitrust law and the current standards that
courts use to assess potential violations. In particular,
this Note discusses the application of the Rule of Reason,
a form of analysis used by courts to assess whether non-
price vertical restraints imposed by upstream producers
on downstream producers violate either section one of
the Sherman Act 5 or section five of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.6 The Rule of Reason requires courts
to consider a number of factors, including the par-
ticular characteristics of an industry, to determine
whether certain business practices constitute illegal
restraints of trade.7 This test has increasingly come
under fire for its vagueness and difficulty in application.'
Part IV of this Note addresses the actions that the
FTC and the Attorneys General of several states have
taken against the various players in the music industry.
This Part discusses the possibility that the recording
industry can withstand the antitrust violations charged
by the FTC and the Attorneys General by proving that
the five largest manufacturers of pre-recorded music
have a legitimate business interest in keeping retailers
devoted solely to the sale of music and music-related
merchandise in business. Essentially, the claim is
that music-centered stores provide valuable informa-
tional services to customers, thereby promoting "inter-
brand" competition, a goal that the Supreme Court
recognized as legitimate when applying the Rule of
Reason test to a non-price vertical restraint of trade.9
I
II. The Music Industry and, its Prac-
tices
A. Structure of the Pre-Recorded
Music Industry
An outbreak of merger activity during the late 80s and
early 90s in the pre-recorded music industry resulted in
the domination of the market by five large multi-media
conglomerates. Sony Corporation of America ("Sony"),
Time-Warner Inc. ("Warner"), Universal Music
Group and Video Distribution ("Universal"), Bertels-
mann Music Group ("BMG") and EMI Music Distri-
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bution ("EMI"), together known as the "Big Five,"
control more than 85 percent of all pre-recorded
music purchased within the United States alone. °
The Big Five operate as "vertically-integrated holding
companies"' -their infrastructure includes various
recording labels and distribution companies. An artist
talented enough to land a record deal typically enters into
an agreement with a label for a fixed number of releases
during the contract term. 2 The label arm of the hold-
ing company works with the artist to develop, produce
and manufacture a recording, while the distribution
arm is responsible for the wholesale marketing of the
finished product to downstream retailers and managing
the creation of catalog works from the artist's inventory 3
Some independent record labels do operate success-
fully. However, the structure of the market for pre-
recorded music gives the Big Five clear competitive
advantages because of their established position in
the industry and ownership of artists' back catalogs. 4
This situation creates high barriers to entry for new
competitors in the market. 5 The manufacture and distri-
of antitrust violations by the Federal
bution of rock and roll music is a high-stakes business-it
generated $38.5 billion in global sales in 1999 alone-
dominated by large, multi-national corporations.'
6
The Big Five record companies generate most of their
sales to the public through independently owned and
operated music retailers. 7 In the early 1990s, music
retailers consisted of both small, locally owned busi-
nesses as well as large nationwide chains, including
Tower Records and Sam Goody's.'8 In each case, tra-
ditional music retailers' product lines consist primarily
of pre-recorded goods and associated merchandise, such
as T-shirts and posters.' 9 Distributors pay for promotion
of their artists by advertising via the Internet, televi-
sion, radio and print publications, in addition to the
use of in-store promotions.20 The distribution arms of
the Big Five record companies cover costs incurred by
music retailers for in-store promotion, including multi-
media displays and lucrative product placement.2' These
"reimbursements" are significant sources of revenue
for retailers, totaling millions of dollars annually.
22
B. A Price War in the CD Retail
Market
During the 90s, the established alignment of the music
distributors and the downstream music retailers shifted
significantly. Large discount chains such as Circuit City,
Target, K-Mart and Wal-Mart began selling compact
discs. 23  In order to increase their market shares,
large discounters sold CDs well below the current
market price.24  These discount retailers were able
to act as "loss leaders," exerting downward pressure
on CD prices, because they could recoup the losses
incurred by selling CDs at a negative profit through
the sale of countless other (unrelated) items.
25
The entrance of discount retailers ushered in a retail
price war in the CD market. The new competition forced











the traditional music retailers initiated a call to arms
against the predatory, loss leading practices of the dis-
counters.2 8  The keynote speaker at the National
Association of Music Retailers' ("NARM") annual
convention, Jack Eugster, encouraged the use of Mini-
mum Advertising Pricing policies as a means to sta-
bilize prices. Eugster, the Chief Executive Officer
of Musicland,2 9 a traditional music retailer, stated:
For years, wholesalers in many industries
have found that minimum advertised price
programs to qualify co-op dollars have been
especially effective in supporting the value
of perceptions of their merchandise. Most
music companies and movie studios have MAP
policies. These programs accomplish their
goals best when the MAP is sufficiently above
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wholesale costs as to not de-value the product
in the consumers' mind. Also, effective MAP
programs consider in-store pricing as well as
advertised policies and condition co-op sup-
port for the entire ad on MAP compliance.30
Eugster's statement reflected the perceived threat
posed to traditional music retailers by the influx of
the large discounters. Earlier in his statement Eugster
warned record companies "to be wary of marketers who
use your product as shills, come-ons and loss leaders for
other merchandise." Traditional retailers like Eugster
were concerned about maintaining the importance of
their relationship with the record holding companies. In
particular, this relationship embodied the creation of a
"consumer value perception" by the downstream
retailers using in-store advertising and promotion.
In response, retailers and manufacturers deemed
that strengthening MAP policies was necessary to pro-
tect against an erosion of "consumer value percep-
tion" caused by the discount chains bargain pricing.
C. Minimum Advertised Pricing Poli-
cies
The large discounters were intent upon gaining market
share in the CD market as a means to attract young
consumers into their stores. Representatives of tradi-
tional music retailers such as Eugster maintained that
price stabilization would result if record distributors
could restrict the information consumers received about
prices.3' Eugster maintained that in order to curtail the
communication of discounted prices, record compa-
nies could restrict promotional funds to retailers who
advertised prices below the amount fixed by dis-
tributors.32 While retailers would not be restricted
from selling at prices below this amount, the com-
munication of such prices to consumers would be
restricted, thus bringing the price war to an end.33
In the early 90s, the distributors initiated practices
known as Minimum Advertised Pricing ("MAP") poli-
cies. According to Billboard Magaziiie, "[w]hen the
price war began, the six majors3 4 each implemented
their own MAP policies, but those early efforts were
considered ineffective."3 5 Between 1995 and 1996,
the executives of traditional music retailers continued
to lobby for tougher MAP policies and their efforts
were rewarded. Each of the major distributors adopted
far more stringent and punitive MAP programs to sta-
bilize prices and protect traditional music retailers.
3 6
The most restrictive MAP programs required retailers
seeking cooperative advertising funds to observe the
distributor's minimum advertised price on all signs and
displays, even if a retailer had paid for the advertisements
herself.37 The MAP programs permitted retailers to
sell at any price, but prohibited them from displaying
discounted prices in any manner, except on small labels
on the CDs themselves. 38 The broad MAP policies
encompassed all advertising, including television, radio
and newspaper, as well as signs and banners within
the retailers' own stores. 39 Failure to adhere to the
provisions of the program resulted in a suspension of all
cooperative advertising payments from the distributor
to the retailer, generally for a period of 60 to 90
days. 40  As the FTC noted in a release dated May
10, 2000, the MAP policies were highly effective.
"The 'price war' ended shortly after the policies were
adopted and retail prices of CDs increased. The dis-
tributors then increased their own prices, and since
1997, wholesale prices for music have increased.
41
Ill. Federal Antitrust Law
MAP programs seemingly run afoul of federal anti-
trust law. Enacted in 1890, section one of the Sherman
Antitrust Act provides that it is a felony to enter into
a "contract, combination, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce."'42 Section two of the Act makes it
a felony to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce. 43 The
Act does not provide a definition as to what constitutes a
restraint of trade or a monopoly. As such, it has gener-
ally been the task of the courts to determine the Act's
parameters. The underlying policy guiding the Supreme
Court in determining whether an antitrust violation
has occurred is the effect that a contract, combination
or conspiracy has on competition.44 While "promot-
ing competition" may seem a relatively clear mandate,
determining whether a given business practice pro-
duces anti-competitive effects is a complicatedbusiness.
223
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A. Per se Illegality and the Rule of
Reason
Courts have adopted two analytical modes to determine
whether a business activity violates antitrust law-the
rule of per se illegality and the Rule of Reason. The
Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pacific Railway
Co. v. United States offers a classic example of the per se
rule at work.45 In 1864 and 1870, Congress furnished the
predecessor company of the Northern Pacific Railway
with land in the Northwest Territories to aid in the
construction of a railroad in the region.46 By the late
1940s, the railway had either sold or leased the land.47 In
the majority of the sale or lease agreements, the company
inserted a "preferential routing clause" compelling the
new owners or lessees to ship any goods that they manu-
factured using only its railway.48 These clauses prevented
two competing railroads from being able to provide an
alternative delivery option and effectively foreclosed
shipping competition in the Northwestern United States. 
49
Justice Black, writing the opinion for the Court,
maintained that by their very nature, certain business
practices are per se illegal under federal antitrust law.
He explained that "there are certain agreements or
practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclu-
sively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use."5 Justice
Black was cautious to note that in order to designate a
given practice per se illegal, it is necessary to ascertain
the actual impact of the arrangement on competition. 1
However, the opinion identified two benefits that flowed
from the per se rule. 2  First, the simplicity and
clarity of the per se rule allows business persons to
order their affairs with a degree of certainty as to
what practices violate federal antitrust law.53 Second,
the per se rule saves courts the time and expense
of inquiring into the practices of a given industry
to determine whether the restraint is "reasonable."5
4
The benefits of a per se illegality standard noted by
the Court in Northern Pacific Railway generally mirror
the criticisms of the Rule of Reason standard. The Rule
of Reason test was first introduced in antitrust litigation
resulting in the famous break up of John D. Rockefeller's
petroleum monopoly. In Standard Oil Co. v. United
States,55 the Court held that it would ascertain
whether a particular business activity was illegal
by determining whether the activity reduces com-
petition, given the totality of the circumstances. 6
As Norman Hawker noted,57 the rule of reason test
announced in Standard Oil was clarified by the
Court in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States. 58
The Chicago Board of Trade, at the time the world's
leading grain market, restricted the hours of day during
which its members were permitted to purchase or offer
to purchase grain from dealers.5 9 The Board's "Call"
rule, adopted in 1906, prohibited offers made between
the "close of Call," generally two p.m., and the opening
of business the next day. 60 In 1913, the United States
sued the Board for its enforcement of the Call rule, alleg-
ing that it was a violation of federal antitrust law.61 The
Board admitted that the rule was in effect and enforced,
but maintained its aim was not to suppress competition
or fix prices, but to reduce the members' working hours
and, more importantly, to break the monopoly position
gained by a number of warehousemen in Chicago.62
In Chicago Board of Trade, Justice Brandeis
applied a balancing test to assess whether the
Call rule had unreasonably restrained competition.
[T]he court must ordinarily consider the
facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed; the nature
of the restraint and its effect, actual or prob-
able. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained, all are relevant facts.6 3
In order to prove a violation of the Rule of Reason,
the plaintiff must establish that, on balance, the activ-
ity pursued by the company suppresses competition
more than the activity promotes it. Important for
the purposes of this Note, the particular character-
istics of an industry are to be included when eval-
uating a business practice alleged to restrain trade.
As noted earlier, one major criticism of the Rule of
Reason is the lack of guidance it gives to those within
the business community. The application of the Rule of
Reason requires a court to balance various factors. Busi-
ness owners have no way of knowing how much weight
Music
a court will give a particular factor or how the court will
define the relevant market. Accordingly, manufactur-
ers and retailers often cannot rely on precedents for
determining whether their practices violate federal
antitrust law. Furthermore, some commentators have
criticized the vagueness of the standard and the
lack of guidance that it gives to lower courts.64
B. Application of the Rule of Reason
to Vertical Restraints of Trade
Despite criticism of the Rule of Reason, during the
past quarter of a century the standard has gained broad
acceptance.65 The use of the Rule of Reason has been
particularly predominant-when the Supreme Court evalu-
ates a "non-price vertical" restraint on trade.66 The term
vertical restraint describes practices involving up- and
downstream producers that have the effect of hampering
competition.6 7 A typical vertical restraint is the practice
of"resale price maintenance" or vertical price-fixing.
68
As the term suggests, vertical price-fixing is
when a manufacturer sets a price either above or below
which the downstream retailer must sell.69 Non-price
vertical restraints of trade are those which do not
involve the actual prices of products and can include
practices such as territorial or customer allocations.7
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding which
analytical mode to use-per se or Rule of Reason-to
assess vertical restraints of trade has been inconsistent.
In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, a
medicine manufacturer sued a retailer for failing to
comply with its system of minimum resale pricing! 1 The
Court in Dr. Miles declared that a price-fixing scheme
designed to eliminate competition between downstream
retailers was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.72
The Court viewed vertical price-fixing no differently
from horizontal price-fixing and condemned the practice
as "having for [its] sole purpose the destruction of
competition and the fixing of prices. " 73 Furthermore,
Professor Warren S. Grimes noted that such a scheme
was likely created for the benefit of retailers.74 He
claimed that "[s] tarting from this premise, opponents of
vertical price-fixing point out that, because such schemes
eliminate direct price competition on the branded item,
they force consumers to pay higher prices. The evi-
dence that consumers pay more is largely undisputed." 75
Eight years later, the Supreme Court created an excep-
tion to the per se illegality standard in Dr. Miles in its
decision in United States v. Colgate & Co. 6 In Colgate,
the government alleged that Colgate had violated
the Sherman Act by refusing to deal with retailers
who would not sell Colgate products at their sug-
gested prices. The Colgate decision marks an early
differentiation between horizontal and vertical arrange-
ments. This distinction has proven salient in later cases.
The Colgate Court's decision rested primarily
on the principle that a manufacturer should enjoy
an inviolable freedom to contract with whomever
she pleases.77  One commentator noted that
[b]ecause section 1 [of the Sherman Act] pro-
hibits only concerted action, however, one
person can unilaterally refuse to deal with
another without violating section 1. This anti-
trust principle underlies the Colgate doctrine,
which permits a nonmonopolistic manufac-
turer to choose freely the parties with whom it
will deal. The Colgate doctrine in particular
permits a nonmonopolistic manufacturer to
refuse to deal with retailers who do not comply
with an announced resale price maintenance
(RPM) policy under which a manufacturer sets
the price at which retailers must sell its goods.78
Essentially, the Colgate doctrine permits suppliers
to cut off certain retailers from selling their products,
so long as it represents only unilateral action on the
part of the upstream manufacturer and the manufac-
turer has yet to transfer the goods to the retailer.
Use of the Rule of Reason analysis by courts exam-
ining vertical restraints was extended further in the
landmark decision of Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania
Inc!9 This case provides the foundation of what Professor
Grimes has described as "Supreme Court interpretations
of antitrust law that are sympathetic to vertical restraints,
including vertical price-fixing. "8 0 The Sylvania deci-
sion demonstrates a clear shift in the Court's thinking
about the possible benefits to competition, and hence,
to consumer welfare, from certain vertical restraints
of trade.81  In adopting this view and applying
the Rule of Reason to certain vertical restraints of
trade, the Court overruled a decade-old decision
declaring exclusive dealing territories, a type of
225
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non-price vertical restraint, to be per se illegal.82
The issues involved in Sylvania are similar to those
arising out of the record holding companies' MAP
policies and stemmed from the control manufacturers
exercised over their downstream retailers. The Supreme
Court was faced with "the rupture of a franchiser-
franchisee relationship that had previously prospered
under the revised Sylvania plan."83 GTE Sylvania, Inc.
("Sylvania") manufactured and sold television sets to
wholesale distributors who, in turn, sold them to retail-
ers.84 In response to its falling market share, Sylvania
instituted a policy that limited the number of franchises
that could operate in a given geographic region and
restricted the franchises to selling its products only
in their assigned territories.85 Sylvania maintained,
and the Court agreed, that this scheme did not create
exclusive dealing territories.8 6 To the contrary, the
purpose of the scheme was to promote interbrand
competition by conferring benefits on retailers who
aggressively promoted the company's products.87
The suit in Sylvania was sparked by Continental's
displeasure with Sylvania for establishing an additional
retail franchise in the San Francisco area, because Syl-
vania was dissatisfied with sales in that area. Simul-
taneously, Sylvania denied Continental's request for a
franchise in the Sacramento region, claiming that the
area was adequately covered.88 The issue in the case
centered on a claim by Continental that Sylvania violated
section one of the Sherman
Antitrust Act by "entering entrance
into and enforcing fran- T F] ernce
chise agreements that pro- E! 5h ered i
hibited the sale of Sylvania in the CD market.
products other than from forced traditional m
specified locations." 89 Con-
tinental maintained that prices to protect t
such arrangements were
per se violations of the Act as interpreted by the
Court in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.
In Schwinn, the Court considered whether a bicycle
manufacturer's distribution arrangement, which limited
sales to franchised retailers, violated section one of the
Sherman Act. In that case, the Court applied the rule
of per se illegality to exclusive territory arrangements
in which the manufacturer transferred "title, dominion,
and risk" to the retailer, but retained control over
the manner in which the goods could be sold.9"
The Court stated that "[u]nder the Sherman Act,
it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer
to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons
with whom an article may be traded after the
manufacturer has parted with dominion over it."91
By contrast, the Sylvania Court explained that exclu-
sive dealing arrangements that involve "consignment
and agency arrangements," in which manufactures do
not relinquish title to the products they distribute through
the retailers, should be evaluated under the Rule of
Reason.92 The Sylvania Court explained that this cru-
cial distinction was muddled in Schwinn: "Application
of these principles to the facts of Schwinn produced
sharply contrasting results depending upon the role
played by the distributor in the distribution system." 93
The Sylvania Court further conceded that both the
Sylvania distribution scheme and the Schwinn arrange-
ment involved attempts to "reduce but not eliminate
competition among their respective retailers through
the adoption of a franchise system." 94 Thus any attempt
to distinguish the two cases based on the fact that
the restrictions imposed by the manufacturers were
slightly different-one involving customers and the
other territories-was futile. Consequently, the Syl-
vania Court overruled its prior precedent in order
to bring clarity to the law of vertical restraints.
The Sylvania Court went on to hold the Rule of
Reason to be the appropri-
ate tool for evaluating ver-
of discount retailers tical restraints of trade.95
a retail price war Relying on Northern Pacific
he new competition Railroad, the Court held
isic retailers to lower that an arrangement must
market shares. be patently anticompetitiveeir mrto justify the imposition of a
per se illegality standard.96
Per se rules force the Court to assert "broad generaliza-
tions about the social utility of particular commercial
practices." 97 The Sylvania Court recognized that con-
siderable uncertainty existed regarding the effects that
vertical restraints have on the market. The Court
stated, "[w]e need to know more than we do about
the actual impact of these arrangements on com-
petition to decide whether they have such a 'per-






redeeming virtue' ... and therefore should be clas-
sified as per se violations of the Sherman Act.
98
When making its determination in Sylvania, the
better-informed Supreme Court was armed with a greater
amount of information about the potential benefits of
vertical restraints. The Court relied on contemporary
economic texts to distinguish between "interbrand"
competition and "intrabrand" competition when
analyzing the effects of a vertical restraint of
trade. 99 The Court explained that "interbrand T
competition" refers to competition among manu- disp
facturers of the same generic product" and
is the key focus of antitrust law. Conversely, exce
the term "intrabrand competition" refers to
"the competition between distributors-wholesale or
retail-of the product of a particular manufacturer?'
The Sylvania Court reasoned that non-price vertical
restrictions restrained intrabrand competition by reduc-
ing the number of distributors available to sell a given
product to a particular group of buyers.' However,
such restrictions can encourage interbrand competition
by creating "efficiencies" in product distribution.'0'
When applying the Rule of Reason it is necessary to con-
sider the "redeeming virtues" of a vertical restraint of trade.
For example, new manufacturers and manu-
facturers entering new markets can use the
restrictions in order to induce competent and
aggressive retailers to make the kind of invest-
ment of capital and labor that is often required
in the distribution of products unknown to
the consumer. Established manufacturers
can use them to induce retailers to engage
in promotional activities or to provide ser-
vice and repair facilities necessary to the
efficient marketing of their products.102
The Sylvania Court recognized that absent a vertical
restraint, the benefits to intrabrand competition created
by a retailer's promotional efforts are subject to the
predatory practices of other retailers.103 Essentially, in
the absence of any restraints, some retailers have an
incentive to "free ride" on the efforts of others. As
one commentator has explained, this concept can be
illustrated by a car dealer that provides a full staff and
fleet of cars for test-driving.04 The cost of providing
such services must, of course, be built into the price
of the cars that the dealer sells.10 5 In the absence of
an exclusive territory arrangement,0 6 the full-service
dealer is subject to being undersold by a dealer who
sells the same cars but at lower prices because she
offers fewer services.10 7 In essence, the low-cost dealer
"free rides" on the services provided by the full-service
d MAP programs permitted retailers to sell
Eat any price, but prohibited them from
laying discounted prices in any manner,
pt on small labels on the CDs themselves.
dealer, because consumers can use the services of the
full-service dealer to make purchasing decisions then
purchase their cars from the low-cost dealer.108 Exclusive
territory allocations prevent against this sort of free riding,
thus allowing full-service dealers to provide pro-compet-
itive services without being driven from the marketplace.
The Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Business Elec-
tronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. makes clear
that the Rule of Reason is the proper analytical mode
for evaluating non-price vertical restraints of trade. 10 9
Business Electronics sold Sharp Electronics products at
retail in the Houston area. 10 Sharp Electronics provided
its retailers with a suggested list of minimum prices for
its goods, but sellers were under no obligation to adhere
to the list prices."' Gilbert Hartwell, a competing retailer
of Sharp products in Houston complained to Sharp that
Business Electronics was free riding on Harwell's "pre-
sale educational and promotional services.11 2 In protest
against Business Electronic's price-cutting, Hartwell
threatened to discontinue selling Sharp products unless
Sharp terminated its dealership arrangement with Busi-
ness Electronics.1 3 Sharp agreed to Hartwell's terms and
discontinued its relationship with Business Electron-
ics." 4 Business Electronics sued, alleging that Sharp
and Hartwell violated section one of the Sherman Act by
conspiring to prevent it from selling Sharp products." 5
In rendering its decision, the Court explained that
its interpretation of section one of the Sherman Act
was guided by the Act's purpose of"prohibit[ing] only
unreasonable restraints on trade."" 6 In accordance with
its decision in Sylvania, the Court reiterated that the
per se illegality standard is appropriate only where the
227
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disputed practice will nearly always result in a lowering
of output such that it is "manifestly anticompetitive." 11
7
The Court rejected the lower court's view that any
agreement between a manufacturer and a retailer to
terminate the relationship between the manufacture
and another retailer who sells at a lower price is per
se illegal. The Court stated that "[i]n the vast major-
ity of cases, it will be extremely difficult for the man-
ufacturer to convince a jury that its motivation was
to ensure adequate services, since price cutting and
some measure of services usually go hand in hand." 118
According to the decision in Sharp, a court cannot
assume that vertical price agreements generally motivate
decisions to terminate price cutters. The Court relied
on Sylvania and Monsanto v. Spray Rite"9 in explaining
that manufacturers often have legitimate reasons for
maintaining the business of a dealer who sells at higher
prices, because of the valuable promotional services the
dealer provides, which, in turn, stimulate interbrand
competition. 120 The Court reasoned that unless an agree-
ment between a manufacturer and retailer includes some
determination of price or price levels, the proper standard
of review is the Rule of Reason.2 ' The Court explained
that instead of deeming the agreement per se illegal,
a court must look at the factors articulated in Chicago
Board of Trade and determine whether, on balance,
the purported restraint does more to promote or pre-
vent competition. And, in the context of non-price
vertical restraints, the Court stated that a court is charged
with analyzing the effects of the restraint on interbrand
competition-"the primary concern of antitrust law." 2'
IV. The Federal Trade Commission's
Response to Music Distributors' MAP
Programs
By the year 2000, the MAP programs instituted by
each of the five major record labels had come under the
FTC's scrutiny. The FTC conceded that the programs
did not constitute a clear-cut resale price maintenance
agreement, and thus could not be deemedper se illegal
under section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
which provides that "[u]nfair methods of competition
... and unfair deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce are ... unlawful." 123 Following the Supreme
Court's decision in Sharp Electronics. 24 FTC Chair-
man Robert Pitofsky noted that absent an explicit
agreement on price levels, the MAP polices could not
be deemed per se illegal. He noted that "[i]n our
view, Sharp requires something more than a showing
that an agreement has some influence on price.'1
25
The FTC did not deem the distributor's MAP pro-
grams illegal per se; rather, the Commission analyzed
cooperative advertising programs according to its guide-
lines and applied a Rule of Reason standard to determine
whether the MAP policies violated section five of the
FTC Act. 26 In applying the Rule of Reason analysis, the
FTC conceded that programs that restrict the communica-
tion of discount prices can operate to foster competition.
27
The reasoning of the FTC's decision focused primarily
on the structure of the MAP restrictions and the general
composition of the recording industry. First, the FTC
noted the broad reach of the restrictive MAP programs.
Unlike other cooperative advertising programs that the
FTC had previously reviewed, the Big Five distributors'
MAP programs restrained dealers from advertising
discounts even when a retailer financed the advertis-
ing with her own funds. 28 The FTC could discern no
efficiency justification for such restrictive policies.
29
Next, the FTC examined the structure of the industry,
particularly noting that five parent companies control
over 85 percent of the market. 30 Significant barriers
to entry also ensured that the five companies would
retain their strong market share. The FTC noted that
the concentration in the industry made it impossible
to assume that downstream retailers could simply opt
not to carry the products of a particular label with
restrictive MAP policies. 3' According to the FTC, the
manufacturers basically forced all retailers to comply.
As the FTC maintained, each distributor instituted
stringent MAP programs solely to stabilize retail prices
and alleviate the downward pressure on the retail price
of CDs imposed by discounters. Pitofsky concluded
that conformity with MAP programs, guaranteed by
monetary incentives, effectively abolished a retailer's
ability to communicate discounted prices to the public.
He noted, "[e]ven absent an actual agreement to refrain
from discounting, this inability to effectively communi-
cate discounts to consumers meant that retailers had little
incentive to actually sell [the] product at a discount."'1
2
A. The FTC Consent Orders
The FTC filed five separate complaints against the
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distributors, alleging that their MAP policies violated
of the FTC Act.'33 Analyzed under the Rule of Reason,
the FTC concluded that these polices were unreasonable
restraints of trade that, taken together, "were unlaw-
ful 'facilitating practices' and increased the risk of
collusion or interdependent conduct by market par-
ticipants. 134  The FTC and the parent companies
of the distributors subsequently settled the claims.
The proposed consent orders that resulted were made
available to the public along with analysis of them for a
thirty-day period. The public comment received by
the Commission reveals the extent to which small,
family owned music retailers strongly favor the MAP
policies as a defense against the predatory pricing
practices of large discounters. One proponent of
the MAP programs, a small business owner wrote:
In the early 1990s, many new music retailers
and mass merchandisers started to sell CDs
at low prices to gain customers and market
share. This 'Loss Leader' concept resulted
in thousands of retail (family owned) record
outlets and major music chains going out of
business ... . The major music distributors
started Minimum Advertised Price (MAP)
policies in 1995 and saved my business
along with thousands of other music retail
stores. In addition to the competition I am
facing with the Internet, digital download-
ing, and MP3, I am confronted by a Com-
mission whose ruling will bring harm to
me, my family and the record industry.
135
Despite these types of public comments, the FTC
unanimously voted to accept the settlement agreements
with each of the five distributors. 36 The settlements did
not constitute admissions that the distributors violated
the law, nor were the distributors required to pay any
fines. 37 The consent agreements did, however, sig-
nificantly restrict the ability of distributors to affect
the retail market price for CDs. Each distributor
agreed to discontinue all MAP programs of any type
for a seven-year period beginning in April of 2000,
the execution date of the consent order agreement.
The consent agreements mandated five other per-
manent restrictions to "ensure that the distributors are
unable to maintain the anti-competitive status quo in
some other way."'138 First, distributors are prevented from
conditioning receipt of cooperative advertising funds
on the market price charged by retailers. 39 Second, the
consent agreements prohibit withholding cooperative
advertising funds because an advertisement funded
entirely by the retailer does not adhere with a MAP
program. 40 Third, distributors cannot make payments
in excess of promotional costs in order to guarantee
that the retailer will comply with a MAP program.
4'
Furthermore, the consent agreements provide a blan-
ket provision in which the distributors broadly agree
to refrain from controlling retail prices. 42 Finally,
for a period of five years, distributors may not,
as is typically permissible under Colgate, refuse to
deal with any retailer who fails to comply with
a minimum advertised or resale pricing policy.143
The Commission asserted that consumers had paid
as much as $480 million more than they should have
for CDs due to the MAP programs instituted by
the distributors. The Commission concluded that
[i]n the future, the Commission will view
with great skepticism cooperative advertising
programs that effectively-eliminate the ability
of dealers to sell product at a discount ....
The Commission will, of course, consider
per se unlawful any arrangement between a
manufacturer and its dealers that includes an
explicit or implied agreement on minimum
price or price levels, and it will henceforth
consider unlawful arrangements that have
the same practical effect of such an
agreement without a detailed market anal-
ysis, even if adopted by a manufacturer
that lacks substantial market power. 4
4
B. Attorneys General Sue
Three months after the five major distributors settled
the MAP antitrust charges with the FTC, New York's
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, together with the Attor-
neys General of twenty-nine other states, filed a civil
complaint against the distributors and certain named
music retailers. 45 The suit, filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York,'
146
alleges that the distributors and traditional music retail-
ers engaged in an "an unlawful contract, combination or
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conspiracy" in violation of section one of the Sherman
Act.'47 The states' complaint maintains that the distribu-
tors' and traditional music retailers' actions constitute per
se illegal violations of the Sherman Act, and are unlawful
when assessed under the Rule of Reason standard as well.
The states, acting on behalf of CD consumers parens
patriae,148 seek to recover treble the amount of damages
allegedly suffered by consumers as a result of the MAP
programs instituted by the record companies beginning
in 1995 and 1996. In addition, the states request that
the court enter judgment against each defendant for the
maximum civil penalties available for each violation
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C. The Rule of Reason as Applied to
MAP Policies
It is the thesis of this Note that when analyzed in accor-
dance with the Supreme Court's decisions in Sylvania
and Sharp, the use of MAP policies by the recording
industry does not violate federal antitrust law. These
policies do not necessarily result in a restriction of
competition or a reduction of output and therefore should
not to be deemed per se illegal. Instead, such policies
can be characterized as a way to ensure that the valuable
promotional efforts provided by traditional music retail-
ers are maintained. As the FTC determined, the Rule
of Reason governs the scrutiny of the MAP programs.
The pro-competitive benefits of MAP programs for
interbrand competition outweigh any harms they cause
intrabrand competition. The FTC erred when it failed
to adequately assess the particular characteristics of
the music industry. Had the FTC properly assessed
how the music industry actually works, it would have
determined that the benefits to intrabrand compe-
tition fostered by MAP policies would have offset
any detrimental effect on interbrand competition.
In light of the particular characteristics of and
demands involved in selling popular pre-recorded music,
it is apparent that MAP policies have a legitimate busi-
ness purpose, and one recognized by the Second Cir-
cuit in E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC.' As
described above, the music industry relies heavily on
promotional efforts, both to sustain the popularity of
an established artist and to launch new artists. One
practicing attorney has noted that "[a] major record label
will likely spend between $500,000 and $1,000,000 to
launch a new artist, with no guarantee that it will see
a return on its
these policies is clearly to investment' 
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Record companies should be free to promote well-known
artists at the local level. MAP policies aid the ground
level promotional effort crucial to the success of emerg-
ing artists, thereby enhancing intrabrand competition.
Record companies can depend upon smaller, traditional
music retailers to help generate word of mouth or provide
information about new artists. Retailers that are devoted
primarily selling music and music-related merchandise
facilitates the dissemination of information crucial to
new artists' success. For example, music-only retailers
often provide a section in their stores spotlighting local
or regional artists and arrange for in-store appearances
by emerging artists. In a large discount superstore
with little extra space, CDs are just one of the count-
less categories of goods sold. Even if such stores are
willing to promote unknown artists by playing their
music, through special placement of their albums or
by arranging for in-store appearances, the magnitude
of the impact on consumers would be substantially
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less simply because of the enormous size of the store.
There are other, less tangible promotional benefits
traditional music retailers can provide that cannot be
easily replicated in large discount chains as well. By
hiring a staff whose primary expertise is in the sale
of music, traditional retailers enhance the information
consumers receive. An employee knowledgeable about
popular music can steer a consumer to a purchase he
or she might not otherwise make. For example, an
employee in a traditional music store will likely be
able to answer a customer's questions about music she
recently heard on the radio or on television or make
recommendations of new artists based on a customer's
current preferences. These services are likely not to be
provided by discount chains because of the nature of the
stores. While it cannot be presumed that the employees
of K-Mart or Wal-Mart have no knowledge of popular
music, discount stores are inherently poorly suited for
this type of promotion because the vast array of goods
being sold in the store likely prevents them from being
able to communicate meaningfully with customers.
Record companies clearly have a stake in maintaining
the well-being and prosperity of stores devoted only to
the sale of music. Consumers' interest in informational
and promotional services are an important means of
establishing an artist or group at the ground level.
This process allows the recording industry to mitigate
some of the risk involved in signing new artists and
helps listeners differentiate among artists. This process
also works to the benefit of interbrand competition,
the competition by record labels for listeners' dollars.
When discount chains entered the music market in the
early 90s they were able to undercut the prices charged
by traditional music retailers, sell at a loss, and still
turn a profit. These chains were able to tap into the
market because of nationwide demand for established
artists and groups. This demand was fostered by the
promotional and informational services provided by tra-
ditional music retailers. Discounters entering the market
were thus "free riding" on the promotional and infor-
mational services provided by traditional music retailers.
The Supreme Court has recognized that federal anti-
trust law permits the use of non-price vertical restraints
to prevent or offset free riding by price cutters and
thereby promote interbrand competition.152 The institu-
tion of stricter MAP programs by the record companies
in the face of discount competition can be analogized
to the situation faced by the Court in Sharp. Like the
agreement at issue in Sharp, the MAP programs did not
constitute an agreement on the actual price to be charged
to consumers. Instead, the MAP programs simply tied
the receipt of discretionary funds to an agreement on
communication of prices charged to consumers.153 The
purpose underlying these policies is clearly to maintain
the level of promotional and informational services
provided by traditional music retailers. To ensure that
the benefits to interbrand competition created by such
services were preserved, record companies had to devise
a plan to make certain that traditional music retailers
stayed in business in the face of the threat posed
by discount chains. Short of providing subsidies,
mandating fixed prices, or merging vertically, the
record companies were able to use the MAP pro-
grams to stabilize retail prices of CDs and allow
traditional music retailers to operate at a profit.
In acting against the recording industry, the FTC
purported to apply a Rule of Reason analysis. A closer
look at the music industry, however, reveals that these
programs should not have been deemed an unreason-
able restraint of trade. The tremendous risks assumed
by record companies who sign new artists or groups
necessitate strong ground level communication with
consumers. Traditional music retailers provide the
necessary dissemination of information to consumers
in a manner that cannot be replicated by large discount
chains. The court deciding the suit filed by the Attorney
General of New York is mandated by precedent to
evaluate the MAP programs under the Rule of Reason,
which requires that "the fact finder weigh[] all the
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restric-
tive practice should be prohibited as an unreasonable
restraint on trade.1 54 In doing so, the court should assess
the MAP programs with regard to the risks inherent in
the music business, the enormous costs associated with
launching new artists and the valuable benefits to inter-
brand competition conferred by the informational and pro-
motional services provided by traditional music retailers.
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